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In Robust Ethics, Erik Wielenberg presents a realist theory of moral properties in moral 
metaphysics and a reliabilist theory of moral knowledge in moral epistemology.  The main 
project of the book is then to defend these views against the most pressing objections to them. 
 At the foundation of Wielenberg’s metaphysics are states of affairs (36).  The states of 
affairs which obtain are facts.  Some facts are contingent whereas others obtain necessarily, 
in all possible worlds.  More importantly, some of the obtaining facts are moral facts that are 
in part constituted by instantiations of moral properties.  These moral properties are both 
objectively real (i.e., not dependant on human attitudes towards them) and sui generis (i.e., of 
their own kind) (8 and 14).  They are therefore non-natural properties that are not reducible to 
any other types of properties.  They cannot be investigated by the methods of empirical 
sciences like natural properties, and they are not divine supernatural properties either. 
 As an example of moral facts, Wielenberg mentions the fact that some activities such 
as participating in a loving relationship are intrinsically good (4).  The intrinsic qualities of 
this activity both make the activity good and provide us with reasons to take part in it (7–8).  
Additionally, some moral facts concerning which non-moral properties make different actions 
right and wrong are also both basic and necessary.  One example of such facts is “that a given 
action is an instance of torturing an innocent being just for fun makes it intrinsically bad” 
(37).  In virtue of this type of basic necessary moral facts, other derivative moral facts obtain 
contingently.  James’s action of pushing a button can be bad because it is an instance of 
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torturing someone for fun.  However, that action is only contingently bad given that it only 
contingently has necessarily bad-making quality of being an instance of torturing someone 
for fun. 
 Wielenberg’s reliabilist account in moral epistemology has two parts.  The first is an 
account of the actual cognitive processes that typically trigger moral judgments in us (89–
107).  It is based on the current state of play in the empirical moral psychology. On this view, 
fast, automatic and effortless mental processes that are inaccessible to our consciousness first 
classify the actions we face by relying on complex hidden principles that latch on to the 
natural properties of these actions.  These classifications then give rise to emotive reactions 
of anger, disgust, and outrage (and presumably in other cases also to positive emotive 
reactions).  These emotive reactions finally causally trigger moral beliefs in us about whether 
the relevant actions are right or wrong.  
 The second part of the epistemological account begins by assuming that there are at 
least some moral facts (87).  It then follows the reliabilist theories of epistemic justification 
and claims that the moral beliefs produced by the previous cognitive process are justified in 
so far as that process is reliable (90-95).  This is when the process, when it works in the 
ordinary way, tends to trigger more often true moral beliefs in us than false ones.  
 The four chapters of Robust Ethics then defend the previous views against different 
sets of objections.  The first chapter explores alternative versions of the claim according to 
which non-naturalist forms of moral realism cannot make sense of the fact that moral 
properties supervene on the non-moral properties.  This is roughly the idea that non-
naturalists cannot tell us why there could not be a difference between the moral properties of 
two states of affairs without there also being a difference between their non-moral base 
properties.  Furthermore, some critics of non-naturalism (like Frank Jackson and Campbell 
Brown) have also argued that already the fact that the moral properties supervene on the non-
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moral properties enables us to reduce them to the non-moral properties (25–26). And, others 
(like Mark Schroeder and Tristram McPherson) have claimed that it would be a significant 
strike against non-naturalism if the view can only take the supervenience relation between the 
moral and the non-moral to be an inexplicable brute fact (21 and 32–33).  
 Wielenberg argues that we can make sense of the supervenience relation in terms of 
the making relation.  If it is always a necessary fact that the instantiation of a certain set of 
non-moral properties makes the actions that have those properties right or wrong, then it 
should not come as a surprise that the moral properties and the non-moral properties co-vary 
across possibilia (23–24).  The making-relation is also why the non-naturalists can reject the 
idea that supervenience is a brute fact and why they can think that supervening moral 
properties are distinct from the base-level non-moral properties.  
 This, of course, leads to J.L. Mackie’s original challenge against non-naturalism.  He 
asked: what in the world do we mean by making here (J.L. Mackie, Ethics – Inventing Right 
and Wrong [Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977], 41)?  We have made progress only if we have 
made sense of something we were previously unable to explain (supervenience) in terms of 
something we understand better (making).  
This is one of the weaknesses of Wielenberg’s position.  He claims that we can 
understand the relevant making-relation as an instance of a special sort of “robust causation”, 
which is different from the ordinary kind of causation (18). The only example of this kind of 
special causation (that does not depend on the laws of nature and which is both necessary and 
simultaneous) we get is the case of God willing a state of affairs and that state of affairs 
obtaining.  The problem is that we have no idea of how divine causation is supposed to work 
and so no explanation is given of how the non-moral properties of actions make them right or 
wrong.  Thus, in the end, Wielenberg’s moral metaphysics are built on a shaky foundation, 
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and yet the critical discussions of Schroeder’s, Jackson’s, Brown’s and McPherson’s 
objections to non-naturalist realism are interesting. 
 The second chapter discusses objections to non-naturalist realism by philosophers 
who think that God is the foundation of morality.  These objections attempt to show that, 
without God, nothing could have value, lives would lack meaning, there would not be moral 
obligations, and we would have no reasons to carry those obligations out even if they existed 
(42–61).  
As Wielenberg notes, standard defences of non-naturalism do not address these 
religious concerns (41).  However, he claims that these objections are important enough to 
deserve responses.  I remain unconvinced.  Wielenberg focuses on a number of objections 
from William Craig, but Craig’s objections amount to no more than hopelessly confused 
rhetorical questions and unsupported statements.  Wielenberg does a good job in clarifying 
what the underlying concerns could perhaps be, and his strategy for responding to these 
concerns is sensible.  He shows convincingly how the theists own ethical theories are equally 
vulnerable to them:  these theories too in the end have to rely on brute moral facts for which 
no external justification can be given (54–56).   
The bulk of chapter 3 explains Wielenberg’s reliabilist view in moral epistemology, 
which I briefly summarised above.  I found this chapter’s overview of the current scientific 
moral psychology the most valuable part of the book.  Wielenberg describes the most recent 
developments in this field in a clear, illuminating and appropriately critical way.  The model 
of how ordinary moral cognition often works, which he constructs on the basis of the 
empirical work, in addition seems plausible. 
The main argument of the chapter, however, is that when we combine this view of 
how we actually make moral judgments with reliabilism we can respond to many 
epistemological objections to non-naturalism.  The claim is that, if moral cognition works in 
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the presented way, then we can acquire knowledge of the causally inert sui generis objective 
moral facts even if we are unable to perceive these facts directly or come to know them 
through explicit inferences or conceptual analysis (109).  We can know what the moral facts 
are as long as the principles which our minds implicitly use to classify actions under various 
categories (which lead to emotional reactions which in turn trigger moral judgments in us) are 
true moral principles. True principles here are ones that track the genuine right- and wrong-
making characteristics of actions (105).         
        This chapter also addresses the epistemic objections to realism which attempt to show 
that, if emotions play a significant role in moral cognition like the empirical sciences suggest, 
this must in itself undermine our moral beliefs (111).  After all, there is no reason to assume 
that the triggers of emotional responses are also morally significant factors.  For example, 
many deontological judgments (you cannot kill a person to save many others) are said to be 
based on reactions of disgust, which are then claimed to be blind to moral reasons (128). 
Wielenberg’s Aristotelian strategy to respond to these concerns is to explain how our 
emotional reactions are malleable and something we can domesticate (117–119).  What we 
are disgusted by depends very much on our moral upbringing and the kind of mental 
dispositions we acquired through it.  Through appropriate moral upbringing our disgust can 
be calibrated to react to features of states of affairs that are genuinely right- and wrong-
making features of our actions (such as unfairness).  If this is right, then the presence of 
disgust in the production of our moral beliefs need not be a distorting factor.  This is true 
even if the morally relevant factors to which disgust is a reaction to are not always 
transparent to us in explicit reflection.  
 As already mentioned, this chapter is an excellent overview of the empirical literature 
in contemporary moral psychology.  I also think that Wielenberg’s attempts to show that 
emotions need not be distorting factors in moral cognition are successful.  He is right to argue 
6 
 
that very often the attempts to show that emotions get us further away from the moral truth 
are based on questionable first-order ethical assumptions.  This chapter is, however, less good 
in its discussions of justification and knowledge in epistemology given how controversial and 
debated these core notions are.  A standard reliabilist framework is accepted too quickly and 
without much explanation or detail.  Few problems of the view are mentioned in the 
beginning of the chapter, but these are left largely unaddressed (92–95).  For this reason, we 
are still quite far away from a satisfactory account in moral epistemology.  
     The last chapter of Wielenberg’s book addresses the common claim that 
evolutionary explanations of our moral beliefs undermine their epistemic justification (134). 
The basic crux of this objection is that, if there is an evolutionary explanation for a moral 
belief, then that belief cannot count as knowledge even if it were true because its truth is in 
this case irrelevant for whether the subject holds that belief or not (146–149).  
 Wielenberg begins the chapter from an account of how moral beliefs could have 
evolved (135–144).  He focuses on our beliefs about moral barriers – the belief that we have a 
right not to be killed, tortured and so on.  If we view ourselves and our kin to be protected by 
these rights, then this provides us with motivation to resist any transgressions.  This will in 
turn lead to fewer transgressions of moral barriers, which improves our prospects of survival. 
We then extend this thinking to everyone because we assume that they too share our essential 
nature that gives us our rights.  This is an instance of applying the evolutionarily beneficial 
principle of treating like cases alike (139–142). 
 Let’s accept that our moral beliefs about our basic rights were produced by the 
previous evolutionary mechanism.  We then do not need to use the truth of these beliefs to 
explain why we have them.  Why would they then count as knowledge even if they were 
true?  Wielenberg offers a version of the so-called “third factor” response to this question 
(144–146).  It begins from the thesis that anyone who has evolved to have beliefs about rights 
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must have certain sophisticated cognitive faculties because already understanding the concept 
of rights is demanding.  The claim then is that we have the relevant rights in virtue of those 
very cognitive faculties.  In other words, having those cognitive faculties itself makes us 
beings who are protected by moral rights.  There is therefore a match between (i) the 
cognitive faculties that enable us to have beliefs about rights and (ii) the qualities in virtue of 
which we have those rights. This match then guarantees the truth of the moral beliefs about 
rights, which we were evolved to have.  Furthermore, this is not an accident.  The moral facts 
could not have been different anyway and given how the laws of nature are it is unlikely that 
we could have evolved to have different moral beliefs (166–175).  
Wielenberg does an excellent job in extracting the different forms of the evolutionary 
debunking argument from Ruse, Street, Joyce and Kahane.  He also convincingly argues 
against the main crux of these arguments. That we can explain what moral beliefs we hold 
without referring to their truth is not sufficient in itself to undermine the epistemic 
justification of these beliefs.  I do have, however, concerns about the focus on rights in the 
response. I’m not convinced that we have the central rights in virtue of the cognitive 
capacities that enable us to hold beliefs about rights.  Do we not acquire rights in virtue of 
being sentient or in virtue of being planning agents?  I’m also not sure how this account 
would extend to our moral beliefs that involve other moral concepts. Do the capacities that 
enable us to think about what is good also in the same way make things good?  
Overall, Wielenberg excels in clearly laying out some of the main objections to non-
naturalist realism in moral metaphysics and epistemology.  He is also very good at finding the 
weak spots of these objections and in presenting philosophically and empirically plausible 
responses to them.  Despite this, I have a major concern about how much philosophical 
progress has been made.  There are at least two dimensions on which philosophical views 
should be evaluated. Being able to respond to objections is, of course, one of them.  
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However, we must also acknowledge that explanatory power counts: the more a 
philosophical theory can explain, illuminate and make sense of, the better it is.  
Some theories are very easy to defend against objections, but we still tend to reject 
them because they lack explanatory power.  Extreme forms of scepticism are like this.  It is 
downright impossible to make objections to these views such that they would rationally 
require the sceptics to change their views.  Yet, many of us ignore sceptical positions because 
there is nothing they can help us to understand.  I worry that Wielenberg’s non-naturalist 
realism in metaethics is exactly like this.  I doubt there are many objections to the view that 
would rationally require Wielenberg change his views.  Yet, when I was reading the book, I 
kept asking myself: what is the defended position helping me to understand?   
The explained empirical science did help me to understand how moral cognition 
works sometimes and the evolutionary theory how we perhaps came to have our moral 
beliefs.  However, the non-naturalist realist elements of the view seemed to offer very little 
constructive help for understanding anything at all.  Wielenberg does not discuss alternatives 
such as expressivism or naturalist forms of realism, but if these views turn out to have more 
explanatory power then we might have sufficient reasons to reject non-naturalism even if it 
can be defended against many of the traditional objections addressed here.     
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